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1 The fallacy of simple concepts
In many sciences, it is customary to create models. Although there are
some sciences where most knowledge is obtained through direct observa-
tions (and previously these sciences prevailed), but a fundamentally new
level can only be achieved by creating models that clarify the essence of
studied processes and phenomena.
Since the author’s experience is limited to mathematical models, first
of all, we will talk about them. The role of these models in other sciences,
and in other areas of activity is very significant. For example, according
to Leonardo da Vinci, “no human investigation can be said true science,
if it cannot be demonstrated mathematically”. However, there are also
opposite opinions about negative influence of mathematical models in
other sciences (see, e.g., [1]). These notes can be regarded as an attempt
to clarify some important aspects of this issue.
What, in fact, is a mathematical model of some real or an imagi-
nary system? A set of relationships that link different parameters and
variables that reflect all significant relationships among elements (and
subsystems) of this system, as well as the relationships with the system
environment. It is obvious that one always try to create any model as
simple as possible, since it will be used to solve various behavioral as-
sessment tasks related to the system, to estimate the influence of certain
parameters on it, etc. I would also like to emphasize that the solutions
to all these problems are actually describe properties of the model, al-
though they are usually transferred to the actual system that the model
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was built on, and this difference is very important for right understand-
ing of the mathematical modeling process.
A special feature of mathematical models is that they are based on a
given formal structure, i.e., enough clearly defined elements and parts of
the system under study and all possible interrelations among them, so
that they can be written in the form of mathematical relations.
For example, number is one of the most fundamental concepts in
Mathematics. The use of numbers (count) or the corresponding scalar
variable (or parameter) in essence means that all properties of the enu-
merated objects are not important for the corresponding mathematical
model, except for their quantity. That is, they in fact belong to the same
type (class) in this model. Of course, some other objects that are more
complex than numbers can be also used. But introducing some common
preference relation for these general objects also postulates implicitly
that they belong to the same class because they allow comparison based
on the entered relation.
Based on this, it is quite clear that a formal structure is being intro-
duced automatically explicitly or implicitly already when creating any
mathematical model. Of course, such a model can be investigated inde-
pendently as a mathematical problem, in particular, to find out questions
about the existence of solutions, their type, and their dependence on pa-
rameters, calculation capabilities, etc. But there is always a question
about the application areas of the model. In other words, one has to
define what real systems have a structure that it is adequately reflected
by the structure of the constructed model. Examples of models that
have applications in completely different areas are fairly well known, but
the main question is in methods for checking the adequacy of models.
Indeed, incorrect structuring (formalization) of the original systems
when creating a mathematical model can lead to useless multi-cost work
and, moreover, to false conclusions. At the same time, the successful
application of the model in one area does not guarantee its adequacy
in another area, or in the case of changing the original real system. In
this connection the situation with the use of models in Physics, where
mathematical model construction has been carried out for centuries, is
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rather favorable. Indeed, in many cases it was not just possible to cre-
ate suitable models of processes and phenomena, but also specify the
conditions (ranges) of their successful applications (see, e.g., [2, 3]). In
other sciences, the situation is not so favorable in many respects due
to the presence of poorly formalized systems. It should be added that
the model that is not structured correctly cannot be improved by using
objects with more general properties.
A well-known example of incorrect formalization is Ptolemy’s geo-
centric system. Its application to position determination of stars and
planets met constantly detected deviations that forced to use more and
more corrections in formulas. Noteworthy, the initial use of the helio-
centric system by Copernicus also revealed deviations from the instant
positions, but they were caused by an inaccurate shape adopted for or-
bits (circles instead of ellipses).
Note that various general system structures and their properties are
studied separately in the theory of systems, and different approaches are
used for this purpose (see, e.g., [4, 5]). However, the issues of compliance
of structures of the model and real system under study, as a rule, you
have to resolve for yourself.
2 Impact of uncertainty
Thus, it turns out that the main problems when building adequate mod-
els arise because of the great complexity of the source systems and the
presence of a variety of uncertain factors, which makes it naturally dif-
ficult to determine the appropriate structure of models. For example,
because of the fundamental impossibility to describe behavior of each
separate gas molecule in statistical physics, one was able to build an ad-
equate model only at the macro level, i.e. to describe, say, the behavior
of a certain volume of the gas as a whole.
Let’s illustrate the effect of uncertainty using the consumer demand
model in the neoclassical theory of market equilibrium (see, for example,
[6]). In this model, the consumer’s demand for goods defined as a set of
solutions to the consumer utility maximization problem on the budget
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set for which the prices of goods are specified as external parameters.
The key element of this model is just this utility function (or, if neces-
sary, the consumer preference relation), whose existence is deduced from
the consumer’s ability to accurately compare values of all goods. Such
a complete determinism of tastes is quite corresponds to the real behav-
ior of a buyer who went to the local market (or a fair) in the Middle
Ages held, say, every week, where the same limited set of home-made
products with similar properties was proposed for sale every time and
almost the same amount of money was used for purchases there (see
[7]). It is clear that a major change in prices could be only invoked
by certain external influence in these conditions. However, the speci-
fied “marginal” demand model used in neoclassical theory to describe
general market behavior within a sufficiently large time interval, with
a large number of participants and a wide variety of products, so that
the same product produced at a different time or place is considered as
a different product. This approach leads to infinite dimensional models
of market equilibrium, which are very difficult even to determine the
conditions of existence of solutions (see, for example, [8]). It is obvious
that the consumer is not able to accurately evaluate the usefulness of all
products in these conditions. Aware of this drawback, but trying to keep
this model of consumer behavior, as the main properties of the model
perfect competition are based on it, supporters of the neoclassical theory
proposed to generalize the concept of the utility function based on the so-
called “rational expectations”, which allowed one to maintain the basic
model structure without changes. Meanwhile, the main difference with
the usual utility function is that the new does contain undefined factors,
and the level of this uncertainty may be arbitrarily high. Therefore, the
assumption of maintaining the “marginal” consumer behavior in case of
unreliable data seems absolutely unrealistic. For this reason, a funda-
mentally different type of the model is required to describe consumer’s
behavior in general.
A fairly popular approach to research and solving problems with un-
certainty is the use of random values, so that the uncertainty is simply
identified with the randomness in many works. Recall that any random
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variable is determined on a set (or space) of elementary events together
with its probability distribution (normalized measure) on this set, and
may be of a continuous or discrete type. However, setting such a measure
itself and associated values does not mean that just a random variable is
determined, as well as any vector with non-negative coordinates, the sum
of which is equal to one is not automatically a probability distribution.
This property requires special conditions that justify the possibility of
utilization of a probabilistic (stochastic) model.
Namely, setting the probability distribution requires statistical stabil-
ity, i.e. evidence based on multiple observations under the same condi-
tions. Obviously, the statistical stability is achieved only when observing
a sufficiently homogeneous and independent process or phenomenon. On
the other hand, the presence of a common measure in the form of the
probability distribution for elementary events also indicates that these
events are of the same type, as noted above about the implicit properties
of applying numbers (scalar variables). Thus, the streamlined utilization
of probabilistic models for essentially heterogeneous diverse phenomena
is incorrect. In addition to the specified conditions, this requires defini-
tion of a formal structure that would be adequate to that of the source
real system. From this we can conclude that not every uncertainty can
be represented by a random variable, and that these concepts are not
equivalent.
A fairly standard technique in game theory describing models of con-
flict situations, i.e. models with uncertain factors, is the utilization of
mixed strategies that are nothing but probability distributions on the
set of (ordinary) pure strategies, which are then elementary events. This
approach leads to a significant complication of the original model, but
relaxes sufficient conditions for existence of equilibrium states (see, for
example, [9]). The presence of equilibrium states makes the behavior
of the described conflict system quite predictable. The implementation
of mixed strategies by players consists in conducting a random exper-
iment in accordance with the corresponding distribution and selecting
the pure strategy obtained for further actions. This approach looks quite
artificial, moreover, it makes sense only in case of multiple repetition of
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playing this game. Then the players’ utilities will tend to their average
values, that is, to the game value in mixed strategies. If the game is
played once, or a few times, the usefulness of mixed strategies becomes
doubtful. In some cases it is possible to utilize the so-called “physical
mixture” of strategies (see [10]). For example, if a pure strategy is to
select a crop for sowing a field, there is no need to produce a random
experiment to select it. One can then just sow the field in proportions
specified by the probability distribution. In the general case, players are
more likely to will base their actions on any additional information about
the other participants, i.e. the game will transform into some multi-stage
procedure. Detailed discussion of utilization of mixed strategies for find-
ing solutions of various games can be found in [11, §14,16], [12, §11].
3 Information flows
The model structure for various socio-economic systems, industrial,
transport and communication, and in general systems related to human
activity should include exchanging information schemes among elements
and blocks (subsystems). This is one of the main differences from the
structure of models in many natural sciences, such as Physics. Under
information hereafter will only be understood as its content, rather than
its volume recorded on any media. That is, description of elements and
subsystems themselves and their relationships is not sufficient for ade-
quate definition of the required system structure without description of
the information exchange scheme.
For example, classical models of perfect and imperfect competition
describe two different types of decentralized systems in Economics. Sep-
arate actions of economic agents (elements of the system) cannot affect
the state of the whole system in the Walrasian type perfect competi-
tion models. But common actions of economic agents can change the
system state. Therefore, each of them in principle need not use infor-
mation about actions (prices, assortment, volumes) or the interests of
some other separate agent. Instead, agents use information about in-
tegral indicators of the entire system (for instance, good prices), which
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may be available to them, although the mechanism for determining com-
mon market prices is not clearly defined in the available models (see, for
example, [13]). On the other hand, separate actions of each economic
agent in imperfect competition models can change the state of the entire
system and, in particular, affect any other economic agent, so the par-
ticipants will use information about actions and interests of others when
choosing their own actions. As a result, it turns out a fundamentally
different game-theoretic model, with a different information exchange
scheme.
One can also find a lot of examples in history when states with the
same government institutions were managed in completely different man-
ners, that is, with different information exchange schemes among these
institutions.
In addition to the above (custom) definition, it is also common to
define the information concept based on probabilistic representations,
which for the difference will be denoted as information (p). For example,
let’s suppose that the set of all possible events for an investigated system
(object) is finite (n) for simplicity, so as the whole set is the union of
these n elementary events. The state S of the system is then defined
by using some probability distribution p = (p1, . . . , pn) on this set, that
allows one to calculate its “entropy”
H(S) = −
n∑
i=1
pi log pi,
which is considered as an uncertainty measure of this state. Therefore,
the maximal entropy corresponds to the greatest uncertainty, i.e. to the
state where all the elementary events may occur with the same probabil-
ity, or simply where pi = 1/n, i = 1, . . . , n. The probability of events, as
usual, can be conditional or unconditional, and the difference of between
two states is just determined as the information (p); i.e., decrease of en-
tropy gives the positive value of the information (p) in this transition
(see, for example, [14]). However, this raises a natural question about
the generality of such approach, since it in fact states the possibility
of existence of one-dimensional representations for any diverse processes
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and phenomena. For example, if the amount of the information (p) in-
creases during the transition to a new state, but it is incorrect, so why
should the entropy decrease? Is it possible to measure the amount of
information in any object at all? It is clear that this measurement is only
possible within some suitable model with the specified formal structure.
In general, both the objects themselves and events with them contain in
fact infinite amounts of information, so such “ubiquitous” measurements
are meaningless. For instance, when replacing one our car with another
of the same kind we clearly understand that it is not the same car.
But within the framework of our model (representation) of a car, it will
perform the same necessary functions, and all the differences between
them, though infinite, are insignificant to us. Hence, we can simply ig-
nore these differences and consider the new car as the same. That’s why
the amount of necessary information about it can be considered finite.
Thus, the information (p) must be related to some specific structure of
the model used. Note that different model structures can in principle
use the same set of information about one object.
This concept is also associated with reflected information (data), i.e.
recorded on certain media, which can be denoted as information (d).
There are many tasks associated with efficient processing, storage, and
transmission of the information (d) on various devices that are not di-
rectly related to the model creation. We can only note that the infor-
mation (d) appears initially on the devices within some specific models,
and the processing issues are to some extent related to the models and
their structures in which they will be used. the differences between these
concepts are clearly indicated, for example, in [15, p. 111]: “The con-
cept of information arose directly from the problems of communication
theory and was specially selected to meet the objectives of this theory.
Since the transmission of a fixed length message over a communication
line requires approximately the same time and expenses both in the case
of an insignificant or even false message and in the case of a message
about the greatest discovery, we must assume from the point of view of
the communication theory that the amount of information in both these
messages is also the same”.
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4 Additional examples
For more clarity, we will give additional illustrative examples of models
of quite complex systems.
4.1 Mean field games
This model is intended to describe the behavior of a team involving a suf-
ficiently large number of dynamic active elements, i.e. each of them has
its own goal function and state equation that determines the relationship
between the trajectories and control functions, as in the custom differ-
ential game. The model is based on the assumption that players differ
only in random terms. Then it is suggested to go to the averaged values
and, after taking the limit on the number of players one can get an opti-
mal control problem, which will consist in maximizing the corresponding
averaged functional on the averaged equation of state. Obviously, this
approach is based on the direct transfer of modeling principles from
statistical physics. But in this case its utilization for socio-economic ap-
plications is emphasized (see, for example, [16]). However, this raises a
natural question about the validity of the approach where the behavior
of, say, gas molecules in a certain volume and behavior of groups of active
elements (individuals) with their own interests and sets of actions are
considered as the same ones. The mean field game model is in fact based
on the assumption that a group of human individuals can be replaced
with its generalized representative, whereas all the basic works in social
and economic sciences always emphasized the difference in behavior of
an individual and a group of individuals.
In particular, the well-known K. Arrow impossibility theorem states
that a collective preference relation, which is consistent for all the team
members, is only possible if it matches one of the individual relations
under rather general assumptions (see, for example, [6, 17]). Therefore,
the whole team behavior will be in general more complicated, and it is
not represented by some common preference relationship, i.e. a different
model is required instead of an optimization problem with respect to
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some preference relation. This assertion it can be illustrated with simple
examples.
Let us consider the election of a team leader when the team consists
of n groups (n > 2), each i-th group nominates its own candidate ai
and sends its representative to the election with its particular preference
relation ≻i. The simplest option for this preference is to consider its own
candidate as the best one, i.e. to choose
ai ≻i aj , ∀j 6= i.
Then it is impossible to choose the leader, except to simply take one of
these candidates, i.e., to take one of the individual preference relations
as the collective. In this case, the share of its support will be equal to
1/n→ 0 as n→∞, i.e. the decision will be absolutely “illegitimate”.
It is also well-known that collective preferences can be non-transitive,
even if all the individual preferences are transitive. It was first noticed
by M. Condorcet in the XV III-th century (see, for example, [17]). We
now give a generalized version of this paradox. In the previous example,
let the representatives compare all the candidates in pairs as follows:
ai ≻1 ai+1, i = 1, . . . , n− 1;
ai ≻k ai+1, i = 1, . . . , k − 2, k, . . . , n− 1, and an ≻k a1,
for k = 2, . . . , n− 1;
ai ≻n ai+1, i = 1, . . . , n− 2, and an ≻n a1.
If we create the collective preference based on the majority votes rule,
we get the cycle
ai ≻ ai+1, i = 1, . . . , n− 1, and an ≻ a1.
At the same time, the support share for any pairwise preference above
is equal to (n− 1)/n→ 1 as n→∞.
By themselves, models with a large number of active elements, includ-
ing those obtained as limit ones from game models are fairly well-known
(see [18, 8, 19, 20]). But all these models are of equilibrium type and
not reduced in general to optimization problems. Hence, they require
somewhat different mathematical tools.
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4.2 A long-term model for management of renewable natural
resources
Since the management of natural resources, including renewable, is essen-
tial for sustainable development of our world, the corresponding manage-
ment tasks are in the spotlight of many researchers. Note that creation
of proper models here requires for many heterogeneous, but interrelated
factors to be taken into account, in particular, economic, environmental,
social ones as well as their outcomes for a fairly long time period. For
this reason, the corresponding models are often very complex from the
mathematical point of view, and involve uncertain factors. Let us take
the long-term forest management model as an example.
First of all, the forests are used for different purposes. In Economics,
forest is a source of timber and fuel wood, in Ecology, it is an envi-
ronment of air purification and carbon absorption, in Biology, it is the
habitat of animals, birds, and plants. Also, the forest may be a place of
rest from the point of view of human society. Any attempt to combine
all these factors into a single goal (utility) function and to specify all the
relationships and restrictions, including the effects of weather, environ-
mental pollution, and invasions of harmful insects, etc., will result in an
actually unsolvable task.
It is therefore necessary to make some decomposition of the problem
into several quite independent blocks. For example, an arrangement of
goals with a decomposition of the planning periods was suggested in [21].
Since the sustainable development is the principal goal, it seems better
to remove evaluations of economic factors from long-term models. Note
that there are a lot of models in this area, which are formulated mainly
as optimal control problems, i.e. as problems of maximization of quality
criteria along the movement trajectories described by a state equation
(see, for example, [22]).
Let us describe this discrete time model; where the time horizon is
we divided into stages (years) t = 1, 2, . . . , T . The total forest territory
is bounded above by S and is divided into many stands, each stand
containing only trees of the same age i = 1, . . . , L. For simplicity, we
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suppose that there is only one kind of trees, since the case of many
species only increases dimensionality within the same model. We denote
by vt = (vt1, . . . , v
t
L) the forest territory vector at the end of the t-th stage,
the initial distribution v0 is supposed to be known. Next, the natural
forest dynamics in the absence of external influences can be described
by the difference relation
vt+1 = A(vt), t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1;
where the operator A in the simplest case is given by a matrix of the
order L. If necessary, it may contain undefined factors, but this will not
affect the essence of the model. We denote by ut = (ut1, . . . , u
t
L) and
wt = (wt1, . . . , w
t
L) the harvest and planting territory (square) vectors
(say, in hectares) within the t-th time stage, respectively, while uti = 0
for i = 1, . . . , l− 1, and wti = 0 for i = l0 +1, . . . , L, i.e. l is the minimal
harvesting age, l0 is the maximal planting age. Also, L is considered
as the maximal product age. Then the dynamics of the forest will be
described by the relations:
vt+1 = A(vt − ut) + wt, t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1;
L∑
i=1
vti ≤ S, v
t ≥ 0, ut ≥ 0, wt ≥ 0, t = 0, 1, . . . , T.
At the end of the planning period, some desired set of feasible distribu-
tions is given, for example,
vT ∈ V,
where V is some set in RL. Among various additional conditions, we
impose only lower bounds (i.e. minimal feasible volumes) Γt of carbon
sequestration per stage t and insert the constraints
L∑
i=1
γiv
t
i ≥ Γt, t = 1, 2, . . . , T,
where γi denotes the carbon sequestration volume from one hectare of
forest of age i per stage, for i = 1, . . . , L.
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The set of feasible trajectories {vt}, {ut}, {wt}, which satisfy the
above restrictions, may be rather large. Therefore, one should choose
the quality criterion for the management. The traditional approach is to
take the profit function along the trajectory. It suffices to determine the
timber price (say, per cubic meter) and timber yield of each forest age,
the unit cost of felling a hectare of forest of each product age, as well
as the unit cost of planting seedlings of each suitable age per hectare.
Then one can calculate the profit value along a given trajectory. The
main drawback of this approach is that the values l and L are large
enough. For the pine forest they are the following: l ≈ 60 years, L ≈ 120
years. Then the planning horizon T should be even longer in order to
take into account than the rotation age, hence, T ≈ 200. Therefore, any
price values for such a long period of time will be unrealistic, and it is
necessary to take a different criterion. For example, one can take a cost
comparison based criterion. Let µi denote the yield of timber from one
hectare of forest of age i and ηi denote the yield from one hectare of
forest of age i after attaining age l (or some other reference age). Then
one can take define the goal function
T∑
t=1
(
L∑
i=l
µiu
t
i −
l0∑
i=1
ηiw
t
i
)
and choose the feasible trajectory that delivers the maximal value of this
criterion. If necessary, one can apply uniform criteria. The resulting
optimization problems are solved with known computational methods.
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